
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/27 : CIA-RDP80T00246A028000660001-8 INFORMATION REPORT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYASA TSC NO This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in a unauthorized person is prohibited by law. BULLETIN NO ._ 25X1 COUNTRY USSR REPORT DATE DISTR. SUBJECT Communications Procedures and Equipment 14 October 1959 Destroyer on a Soviet 25X1 and Other Soviet Naval Vessels NO. PAGES REFERENCES DATE OF 25X1 INFO. PLACE & DATE ACQ. SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. 25X1 The radio receiving center of the Project 30-bis ("SKORYY-class") destroyer contained one Rusalka (Mermaid) receiver, three Khmel 25X1 (Hops) receivers, an Akatsiya (Acacia) VHF radiotelephone, a small reserve all-wave transmitter called Uran (Uranium), which was used primarily for short wave, and switchboards which permitted connecting the receivers and transmitters with other posts, such as the bridge and combat information point (BIP--boyevyy informatsionnyy punkt). The entire receiving center radio complex was referred to as "R-609". Rusalka had a sensitivity of not less than two to three microvolts and cost 1,600,000 rubles; the Khmel was a more common type of receiver which cost only several thousand rubles. Rusalka operated in the 10 - 200 meter band, for Morse and voice reception. It can shift automatically to any of twelve frequency ranges and automatically tune to the best signal. It was the largest receiver aboard approximately 70 by 70 by 70 centimeters. There were 25X1 several versions of Rusalka. The transmitting center had two transmitters, a 1.2-kw Neptun (Neptune) and a 250-watt Lira-D (Lyre-D); "D" stands for <u>Diskretnik</u> (discrete). Crystals could be used with the Lira-D. One of the ship's three Akatsiya VHF radiotelephones was also located in the transmitting center, as was a reserve all-wave receiver. ship also had a radio relay shack equipped 25X1 with two receivers and a switchboard to all points. This was a loudspeaker system used for propaganda and cultural purposes. the most important item of communications equipment was a rapid-communication apparatus (apparatura bystro-25X1 deystvuyushchey svyazi) called Biryuza (Turquoise). This was not a transmitter or receiver, but could be used with any medium or high frequency receiver or transmitter to send any type of message under almost any Change to PER RECRADING BULLETIN NO. 21-25X1 X ARMY X NAVY (Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".) INFORMATION, REPORT INFORMATION REPORT ARCHIVAL RECORD Return to Archives & Records Center Immediately After Upor COPY_//_OF__COPIES 25X1 \$

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TOP SECRET

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	[known, the distance could be determined fairly precisely. This equipment was developed for Stheet Army, but the tests were so successful that the Navy decided to order such equipment. The transmissions of	25 X 1
		Soviet ships were monitored during the tests.	
	8.	The installation and testing of this direction-finder were performed by a group of specialists from a Ministry of Defense communications institute in Leningrad. This institute had Army, Air Force, and Navy departments, and worked on both civil and military electronic equipment. The group from the institute consisted of eight persons, including a colonel and lieutenant colonel, and was headed by Engineer Captain First Rank Dyachenko.	
			25 X 1
	9.	Cruisers had a top secret decimetric radiotelephone called Shlyupka (Boat) which could be used for secure conversations in the clear with any point in the USSR. It transmitted on a very narrow beam with a range of eight to ten nautical miles from ship to shore and then followed regular telephone lines. It could be used with the VCh (vysokaya chastota) secure radiotelephone met, and was like that met, not like Akatsiya, since Akatsiya was a circular transmission which	
		could be heard all around. Shlyupka came into service in the last two years; it could not be used ship-to-ship, but only by preararangement with a shore station which was at a precisely known geographical point. Audibility on Shlyupka was excellent, perhaps a little harsh, but it was not necessary to talk loud when using it. A normal dial telephone was used with it. Cruisers also carried permanently installed intercept and direction-finding equipment, and	
		intelligence officers occasionally placed such equipment on other vessels. The cruiser SVERDLOV had new cipher equipment which was installed for ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship communications; the cruiser ORDZHONIKIDZE was also to get this equipment, which might be used with Biryuza. Destroyers and submarines did not have cipher machines, only cruisers and Fleet Headquarters, but there was talk of placing such machines of a smaller size aboard one or two ships of a destroyer brigade, such as the flagship and second ship.	25X1 ×
	10.	Three watches were Morse watch, radiotelephone watch, and Biryuza watch. If Biryuza was out of order, telegraph was used, then radiotelephone. The control point was the radio shack, where the watch was set, and the radioman served as a check on the watch officer or communications officer. A recorder such as was used with sonar was used to record everything that came in, and it could also be used to transmit. Transmitters always worked at minimum power, and all radios were turned off when in port.	25X1
	11.	The only persons permitted in the radio rooms were the captain, senior assistant to the captain, the radio officer, the watch officer, and radiomen. Only the captain and cipher clerk entered the cipher shack. The cipher clerk was a chief petty officer (starshina); prior to 1950 officers acted as cipher clerks. Messages were released by the captain or radio officer. When the captain wished to send a message he called the cipher clerk, who would bring him the message forms. The captain wrote the message and ordered it to be enciphered. When it was enciphered the clerk called to ask permission to send it. The captain	
			25X1

	could also leave instructions with an officer on the bridge that the message be sent as soon as it was enciphered, or might in unusual circumstances tell the clerk to send the message as soon as it was enciphered, without calling the captain for permission. If a message were for Moscow it would be sent to the nearest shore station and relayed from there; the clerk knew how to prepare the message for whatever addressee was to receive it. The precedence of messages was
	routine, urgent, extremely urgent, or flash (vozdukh or V Z D).
L	submarines could communicate with aircraft only via shore stations.
	The Navy operated control stations which monitored all transmissions by naval vessels to watch for violations of communications security. Ships were directed to operate within specific radio networks, and all these networks were monitored around the clock by the watch at the control stations. There were other control stations which intercepted enemy communications; these stations were sometimes subordinate to the Navy and sometimes subordinate to some other office.
L	When a violation of the rules for radio traffic occurred the Fleet Communications Department called it to the attention of the Chief of Communications, who reported it
	to the Chief of Staff. The offending vessel received a notice of the violation if it was minor, but more drastic measures were taken by higher offices if the violation was more serious.
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